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This paper discusses a set of statistics for examining 
and comparing labor market dynamics based on the 
estimation of continuous time Markov transition 
processes. It then uses these to establish stylized facts 
about dynamic patterns of movement using panel data 
from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The estimates 
suggest broad commonalities among the three countries, 
and establish numerous common patterns of worker 
mobility among sectors of work and inactivity. As such, 
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we offer some of the first comparative work on labor 
dynamics. The paper then particularly focuses on the 
role of the informal sector, both for its intrinsic interest, 
and as a case study illustrating the strengths and limits 
of the tools. The results suggest that a substantial part 
of the informal sector, particularly the self-employed, 
corresponds to voluntary entry although informal salaried 
work may correspond more closely to the standard 
queuing view, especially for younger workers. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
Traditional static analysis of labor markets provides evidence on stocks of 
workers found in different labor markets states, but can tell us nothing about where those 
workers arrived from, how long they will stay, or where they will go next.  The 
importance of answering these questions and developing the tools to do so has been 
increasingly apparent in the mainstream literature, for example, on the causes of 
unemployment, (whether due to shedding of labor by firms or reduced hiring) or in 
understanding the different motivations behind being unemployed vs. out of the labor 
force (see, for example, Flinn and Heckman 1982, Blanchard and Diamond 1989, Shimer 
2005 and Hall 2005).  Increasingly, panel data sets are becoming available in the 
developing world that facilitate greater understanding of how those labor markets 
function and how they may differ from advanced country markets.  
 
This paper discusses and develops a set of statistics based on the estimations of 
continuous time Markov transition processes and employs them to study and compare  
labor market dynamics in three developing countries Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  The 
methods of estimating instantaneous probabilities (intensities), durations, and 
probabilities conditional on separation  (propensities)  as well as the discussion  of the 
embeddability of the estimated transition matrices follow closely the work of  Fougère 
and Kamionka (1992 a,b,c).  We discuss the importance for inference of conditioning on 
both rate of separation and job turnover in the destination sector and show that a statistic 
that adjusts for both has the interpretation of workers’ revealed comparative advantage 
for particular sectors.  The estimates suggest broad commonalities among the three 
countries, and establish numerous common patterns of worker mobility among sectors of 
work and inactivity.  As such, the paper offers some of the first comparative work on 
labor dynamics.
1     
 
 
                                                 
1 See Bosch and Maloney (2005) for the first application of continuous time Markov processes to 
Argentina, Mexico and Brazil and more recently, in a discrete context, Duryea et. al (2006) that examine 
both Eastern European and Latin American data. 
  1 
We focus in particular on one question with important similarities to the advanced 
country literature noted above-  the role of the informal labor market- both because of the 
topic’s intrinsic interest, and because it offers a case study through which to view the  
strengths and weaknesses of these tools.  Though a notoriously elusive concept, we 
define the informal sector as comprising the mass of owners of and or workers in small 
firms who are uncovered by labor legislation.
2 At the risk of excessive stylization, one 
view with conceptual roots in Harris and Todaro (1970) equates the informal sector with 
underemployment or disguised unemployment- the disadvantaged sector of a market 
segmented by rigidities in the “formal” or covered sector of the economy.
3  However, 
another emerging view keys more off the mainstream self-employment literature in the 
style of Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982) and Evans and Leighton (1989), and argues that, 
as a first approximation, entry into the sector should be seen as a vocational choice in line 
with the worker’s comparative advantage, to work in a more entrepreneurial sector, albeit 
one with irregular relations with the state.
4   
 
We show that nature of the aggregate Markov-based statistics as reduced forms 
capturing both comparative advantage considerations as well as barriers to mobility 
makes drawing inferences from the observed patterns difficult.  We therefore explore 
additional identification strategies exploiting some of the predicted patterns of worker 
dynamics suggested by the competing hypotheses about informality.
5  The results suggest 
that a substantial part of the informal sector, particularly the self-employed, corresponds 
                                                 
2  A minority, generally no more than 25% of the informal salaried workers are found in firms of over 6 
workers (see Perry et. al 2007) so this is primarily a micro firm phenomenon.  
3   This is, in fact, an extreme stylization although its essential focus on the dualism of the labor market and 
the intrinsic inferiority of informality is common to many models. See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a 
more comprehensive review of existing views. A rich theoretical literature is emerging that poses more 
sophisticated mechanisms that relate informality to unemployment. See, for example, Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2006). 
4 See for instance, Rauch (1991), Loayza (1996),  Maloney (1999, 2004), Boeri and Garibaldi (2006), de 
Paula and Scheinkman (2007), Loayza and Rigolini (2007) postulate a continuum of entrepreneurial ability 
and workers sorting themselves among different formal and informal sectors of work.   
5 The two views are, of course, compatible to some degree given the heterogeneity of the sector, and 
existing theory can accommodate this: a turnover based efficiency wage model such as that of Stiglitz 
(1974) allows for firms raising wages above market clearing to deter workers from entering self-
employment and, in the process, creating involuntary informality. The issue is really one of degree- what 
the “stylized” view of the functioning of the sector should be.  
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Estimating continuous time Markov processes 
 
As Fougère and Kamionka (1992a) note, an earlier generation of studies focused 
on estimating transition probabilities between two periods of time in the context of a 
discrete time Markov chain.
6 More recent work, including theirs for France and 
Kalbfleish and Lawless (1985) seek to use discrete panel data to estimate the transition 
intensities from an underlying continuous Markov process. This has several advantages. 
First, as pointed out by Singer and Spilerman (1973), the natural time scale for many 
mobility processes is not a discrete sequence of intervals such as generations or decades 
but a continuum of time points. Labor status mobility can be viewed more realistically as 
a process in which states changes occur at random time points, and probabilities of moves 
between particular states are governed by Markov transition matrices. Secondly, as 
suggested by Fougère and Kamionka (2003), the analyst has access to individual panel 
data, which, in general, do not provide observations of continuous labor market histories, 
and they do not allow identifying directly measures of duration of individual employment 
and unemployment spells, or the probability to become unemployed at the end of an 
employment spell. 
 
One way to draw statistical inference of such parameters is to assume that the 
observed discrete-time mobility process is generated by a continuous-time homogeneous 
Markov process.  We assume a homogenous Markov process Xt defined over a discrete 
state-space E ={1,….K} where K is the number of possible states (job sectors) a worker 
could be found in.  The worker if observed at equally distanced points of time. With that 
information one can construct a discrete time transition matrix P(t,t+n) where 
                                                 
6 Notable examples of such estimates of labor market transitions would include Hall (1972), Toikka (1976), 
Clark and Summers (1979) Akerlof and Main (1981) and Poterba and Summers (1986) for the US.  See 
Hamilton (1994) for a concise explanation of Markov chains. 
  3 
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The interpretation of  is simply the probability of moving from state i to state j in one 
step (n). Discrete time matrices are easily straight forward to compute as the maximun 
likelihood estimator for   is 
ij p
ij p i ij ij n n p / = , being  the total number of transitions from 
state i to state j and  the total number of observations initially in state i. As   , this 
gives rise to a kxk transition intensity matrix Q where 
ij n
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Thus, the elements  can be interpreted as the instantaneous rates of transition 
from state i to state j. In practice, the estimation of the continuous time transition matrix 
is subject to two major difficulties.  First of all, solution to equation 2 may not be unique. 
This is known as the aliasing problem.  That is, it is possible for an observed discrete 
time matrix to have been generated by more than one underlying continuous matrix. On 
the other hand it is possible that none of the solutions obtained for Q is compatible with 
the theoretical model expressed in equation 1 where the elements of Q have to satisfy a 
set of restrictions shown in equation 3. This is known as the embeddability problem.  
ij q
 
  4Two main approaches have been followed by the literature to estimate the Q 
matrix and draw statistical inference.
7 Kalbfleisch and Lawless’s (1985) maximum 
likelihood procedure estimates the elements of Q using a quasi-Newton or scoring 
algorithm. The main drawback of this approach stems from the fact that if P is not 
embeddable, then inference using the maximum likelihood is not reliable as standard 
asymptotic theory no longer applies
8.  
 
Geweke et all (1986) propose a Bayesian procedure for statistical inference on 
intensity matrices as well as any function of the estimated parameters by using a uniform 
diffuse prior which allows to establish the probability of embeddability of the discrete-
time matrix.  Roughly speaking, the method consists of drawing a large number of 
discrete time matrices from a previously defined “importance function,” assessing their 
embeddability and constructing confidence intervals of the parameters or functions of 
interest using only the posterior distribution of those matrices that turn out to be 
embeddable.  This also provides a very natural way of assessing the probability of 
embeddability as the proportion of the embeddable draws. We have followed this 
approach, which has also been employed in Fougère and Kamionka (1992 a,b,c). 
 
Controlling for likelihood of separation and measuring duration 
 
The intensities simply tell us the probability of a worker moving across a sector 
but do not permit any inference relative desirability or ease of entry since they combine 
the latter with any intrinsic disposition to separate.  Hence, a statistic standardizing on 
probability of separation, the propensity, facilitates comparing entrants into a particular 
terminal sector from distinct sectors of origin. 
  
                                                 
7 For an excellent overview of this topic see Fougère and Kamionka (1992a) 
8 The reader is again referred to Fougère and Kamionka (1992a).  For an earlier very preliminary paper 
estimating continuous time matrices for Mexico and Argentina using this technique see Arango and 
Maloney (2000). 
  5We obtain this propensity decomposing the intensity matrix Q into two more 
manageable indicators: rate of separation and propensity to move.  This can be done 
























































and where elements  for  ii ij ij q q r / − = j i ≠ and  K i ,..., 1 = . From this, we can back out 
average duration in state i which can be shown to be distributed exponentially  
) exp( ~ ii i q d − , 
and which, in turn, allows us to retrieve the mean duration time en each sector as  
1 ) (
− − = ii i q d E  
  
 The  rij elements provide a measure of transition probabilities conditional on the 
general rate of turnover in the sector.  This can be interpreted as “if all workers were to 
leave their initial sector at the same rate, what would be the probability of ending in each 
sector.” a concept we will refer to as the “propensity.”  The propensity matrix is 
especially useful when comparing rates of transition for different groups of the 
populations. For instance, the intensity of transition into sector j from sector i may be 
higher for group h than for group g, 
) ( ) ( g
ij
h
ij q q > ,but this may only imply that more type h 
workers leave sector i at any instant than workers type g.  If we seek to understand the 
predisposition of a moving worker to enter one sector relative to another, we need to 
compensate for turnover. Turnover, of course, may be somewhat determined by the 
choices available to move to and hence this separation must be seen as a limiting case of 
independence of the two. However, the point  is important and has implications, for 
example, for standard multinomial logit analysis.  Relative odds ratios of say, a particular 
type of workers entering a particular type of employment are often interpreted as 
capturing intrinsic relative preferences of that type of worker relative to others types.   In 
fact, it may purely capture higher levels of separation of that class of worker into all types 
of employment.     
  6 
 
Controlling for job openings; measuring comparative advantage 
 
If we are only interested in movements of workers from different sectors to a 
common destination, then the propensity is adequate.  However, comparing tendencies of 
transitions to multiple destinations introduces complications analogous to those the 
propensity measure in compensating for on the sector of origin side.  A worker leaving 
school may be more likely to enter a given sector purely because there are more jobs 
available in that sector, rather than capturing any intrinsic preference for that sector.  
Hence, some standardization on the availability of jobs is desirable.  Maloney (1999) 
standardized on terminal sector size, implicitly comparing observed rates of transition to 
what would occur in a random reshuffling of all workers across sectors.  However, 
standardizing on terminal sector size implicitly assumes that positions in all sectors open 
at the same rate.  A better measure would account not only for size, but rate of opening, 
thereby comparing observed transitions with a random allocation across available 
positions in all possible destination sectors, Tij=rij/() where () is a measure of new 
openings in sector j as a proportion of total new job created in the economy available for 
the individual in sector.   
 


















where    is the propensity (probability of transiting given separation) of going from 
sector i to sector j ,   is number of individual moving to sector j from any other sector 
and    is the number of individuals who started in sector j and remained in sector j.  The 
authors interpret   as the total number of jobs created in sector j, although it 
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kk k n n captures loosely speaking the total number of 
jobs openings available for individuals that leave sector i.  Hence  can be interpreted as 
the propensity of transiting from i to j controlling for job openings in sector j as a 
proportion of total openings available for individuals existing sector i.  It is 
straightforward to show that rates of separation from sectors of origin net out so that in 
continuous time this is, in fact, the R matrix of propensities standardized by job openings.  
ij T
 
  Importantly,  we call attention to the fact that the T matrix’s structure can be seen 
as the ratio of i’s probability of transiting into j over its probability of transiting into any 
sector not equal to i, relative to the analogous ratio for the entire workforce.  It thus takes 
the same form as the Balassa (1965) measure of Revealed Comparative Advantage in 
trade where the measure is a country’s relative exports of good relative to the global 
analogue.  Thus, the T matrix, assuming the absence of any barriers to mobility, can be 
seen as a measure of revealed comparative advantage in the labor market.  The idea that 
workers’ relative endowments of characteristics determines their comparative advantage 
in different types of jobs appears in Lucas’ (1978) discussion of choices between salaried 
work and self-employment, and explicitly in Rosen (1978), Heckman and Sedlacek 
(1985), Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).  That we normally think of workers as 
completely specializing (although in fact many may hold two or more jobs) is analogous 
to the case where international prices lead countries to dedicate all of their resources to 
the production of one good.  As in standard limited dependent variable analyses, when we 
aggregate across many individuals, unobserved characteristics may cause observationally 
equivalent workers to be stochastically allocated across several sectors rather than being 
uniquely found in one.   
 
  Thinking of T as measuring comparative advantage offers some intuition for the 
patterns of movements we identify across sectors.  The more two sectors are similar in 
the worker characteristics used “intensively,” the more we may find them showing very 
similar patterns of revealed comparative advantage. In the limit, and with no barriers to 
entry or mobility, we might expect T values characterizing flows between those sectors to 
  8be of similar magnitudes in each direction.  Again following Lucas, we might find that 
workers with a comparative advantage in salaried work may show higher T’s among 
salaried positions in both the formal and informal sectors than relative to self- 





  Finally, as in Bosch and Maloney (2005) we employ an overall measure of 
mobility of the intensity matrix to assess the can be computed following Geweke, 
Marshall and Zarkin (1986) who extend the work of Shorrocks (1978) in the construction 
of mobility indices in discrete time to continuous time models. This index satisfies a 
series of desirable properties such as monotonicity, strong immobility; velocity and 
freedom from aliasing (see Geweke 1986). It takes the form of 
 
K Q tr Q M / ) ( ) ( − =  
 
Since aggregate mobility is thought of as a benchmark of labor market flexibility (see for 




  An important caveat accompanies all these measures: they are fundamentally 
reduced forms combining elements of comparative advantage (worker endowments and 
preferences) and demand factors which are affected, as in the traditional market 
segmentation hypothesis, by any barriers to the free allocation of labor across sectors.  
Hence, while a finding of a high degree of symmetry of T statistics, for instance, is 
suggestive of unrestricted allocation, it is also potentially consistent with other scenarios 
where there are barriers to movement. Hence, additional sources of identification are 
important to provide insight into the factors driving a particular transition.  We explore 
two types.  First, we look at the variance across worker characteristics and in particular 
  9across age, education, and gender.  Second, taking Mexico as an example, we look at the 
pattern of mobility across time and how they vary across the business cycle.  In both 




To construct the time continuous matrices we employ three different surveys 
which compile information about labor status of workers and other relevant information.    
 
Mexico 
The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU National Urban Employment 
Survey) conducts extensive quarterly household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan 
areas. The questionnaire is extensive in its coverage of participation in the labor market, 
wages, hours worked, etc. that are traditionally found in such employment surveys.  The 
ENEU is structured so as to track a fifth of each sample across a five quarter period. We 
have concatenated panels from the first quarter of 1987 to the forth quarter of 1999. For 
each individual contributed with tow transition pairs (from 1
st quarter to the forth and 
second to the fifth.) giving rise to approximately 1,785.000 transitions, 810,000 for men 
and 975,000 for women. 
  
Argentina 
In a similar fashion for Argentina, we use the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH Permanent Household Survey), a panel covering the area of the Federal District and 
surroundings (Gran Buenos Aires), which accounts for approximately 60% of total 
Argentina employment.  The survey is conducted every 6 months (April/May and 
October) with a 25% rotation of the panel. As a consequence, each household is followed 
for two years at sampling intervals of six months. We employ panels from May 1993 to 
October 2001. The sample is notably smaller than the Mexican and Brazilian surveys and 
we can only study 29,000 transitions, 13,900 for men and 15,100 for women. 
 
 
  10Brazil 
The Pesquisa Mensual do Emprego (PME- Monthly Employment Survey) follows 
monthly employment indicators. Households are interviewed four months in a row, and 
then re-interviewed eight months later. 25% of the sample is renewed every month. 
Given this panel structure we can construct four yearly employment status transitions for 
each individual. We have put together 9 consecutive panels starting in February 1982. 
Each panel consists of 12 consecutive cohorts covering approximately 2 years covering 
the period 1982-2001. The total number of transitions is 2,520,000: 1,190,000 for men 




We divide the labor force into three sectors of work: formal salaried, informal 
salaried and self-employed. While the term "informal" suffers from overly broad and 
imprecise usage, it refers here to owners (self-employed) and workers (informal salaried) 
who do not have social security or medical benefits and are therefore not protected.   
Formal salaried workers are defined as those enjoying labor protections. The remainder 
of the sample is divided into two groups those out of the labor force, and the unemployed.  
 
The sample was further divided into two education groups, those with 8 or less 
years of education  (low education) and those with  more than 8 years (high education)  
as well as  three age groups:  less than 24 years of age, 24 to 40, and then above 40. We 
follow Kamionka and Fougere in assuming time homogeneity within each age class but 
not necessarily across age classes.  That is, we hypothesis that if t is the calendar time, 
and a the age of the individual,   where m corresponds to each of 
our sub-divisions of the sample. Table 1 retrieves the summary of the population 
distribution among different sectors split according to age and education. 





  11IV. Patterns of Mobility 
 
We estimate continuous time matrices from the discrete transition data as 
described above.  Table 2 reports the posterior probability of embeddability and suggests 
that the Brazilian and Mexican matrices are clearly embeddable for all different 
subgroups. Argentina, however, shows probabilities near unity for the overall matrix and 
runs into problems when the division of the sample reduces the number of observations.  
 
Tables 3a-c present the estimated Q matrices of intensities-the instantaneous 
probability of moving from sector i to j, and its two component parts, the rate of 
separation from the each sector, transformed into the mean duration of stay in the sector, 
and the matrix of propensities to move from i to j conditional on separation from the 
previous state.
9 The intensities, propensities, and the propensities adjusted by job 
openings (the T matrix) for select sectors of interest are shown in figure 1a and b, and the 
durations in figure 2.   The Q matrices suggest that the three labor markets are broadly of 
the same phylum, showing a high degree of commonality in most any arbitrarily chosen 
transition.  Argentina does differ in some key aspects that seem especially related to the 
very high rates of unemployment as we discuss below. Hence, were we to study the 
markets at the same point in the business cycle, even greater commonalities may emerge.   
 
 
 Transitions between formal and informal jobs. 
 
  Analysis of the transitions among sectors of work provides the clearest illustration 
of the relative merits of the different statistics developed above.  It is also in the realm of 
intersectoral transitions that some of the strongest hypotheses about the functioning of the 
developing country labor market have been postulated.
10  Again, more traditional 
segmentation models would predict than, on average across the business cycle, workers 
                                                 
9 In the interest of space, we do not report the complete T matrices as well.  Available on request.  
10 Ideally, we would have data that permit studying job to job movement including those within a sector -
which evidence from the US suggests is vast (Nagypal 2004), but we do not.  However, for the purposes of 
identifying patterns of interaction among the informal and formal sectors, this is not a major drawback. 
  12may graduate from informal jobs into formal jobs, much as third graders graduate into 
fourth grade.  However, if informality is just one of many characteristics of jobs of 
overall equal quality attracting workers with similar comparative advantage, then we 
might expect conditional flows in both directions and, as discussed before, of comparable 
magnitudes.    
 
Figures 1a and b provide graphical representation of the three sets of transition 
matrices corresponding to the raw intensities, propensities, and propensities adjusted for 
job openings (the T or comparative advantage matrix).  What is immediately obvious 
from the intensities is that there is a high degree of similarity in flows across countries 
and across sectoral pairs.  In all countries, formal salaried-self-employment flows are 
small relative to informal salaried-self-employment flows and, especially, informal 
salaried-formal salaried flows. In particular Brazil and Mexico, the magnitude of the 
flows is quite large.  Most dramatically, between 40 and 50% of informal salaried 
workers will transit to formal sector jobs across the course of a year.  These labor markets 
appear very dynamic. Also striking is the large asymmetry in the informal salaried/formal 
salaried flows that do, indeed suggest a more traditional queuing view of the sector.  The 
probability of moving from informal salaried to formal salaried is much higher than in the 
reverse direction. 
 
However, moving from intensities to propensities the flows are more symmetrical 
and, in some cases reversed.  For Argentina and Brazil, the relative flows among the four 
sectors are reversed moving from intensities to propensities except for one case, and in 
Mexico the formal-self-employed and formal-informal flows become far more 
symmetrical. Again, this illustrates a more general issue: logit exercises that seek to 
explain entry into self-employment from informal salaried and formal salaried sector will 




  13 Turnover, duration and labor market flexibility 
 
What is driving the substantial change in our picture of relative mobility, by 
construction, is the adjustment for rates of turnover in the initial sector.  As a means of 
illustrating the importance of this, Figure 2 plots the absolute mean duration of stay, the 
inverse of turnover, in each sector.  Again, the similarities across countries are far more 
striking than the differences.  In all three countries, for both men and women, formal 
employment shows the longest average duration, around 4.5 years. Informal forms of 
employment show lower duration/faster turnover. This is particularly the case for 
informal salaried work which consistently across countries shows an average duration of 
around a year. Hence, it is not surprising that standardizing on these very different rates 
of turnover changes the observed inter-sectoral mobility intensities so much.  
 
There are important differences that are worth noting. Argentina shows a much 
higher duration in unemployment than the other two countries and, in contrast to the 
other two countries which show constant duration across ages, a rise among younger and 
older entrants (figure 3a). Both plausibly, reflects the very depressed labor market across 
the sample period.  Although the ranking of duration- formal employment, self-
employment and informal salaried employment- is shared by women as well, they also 
show far longer spells out of the labor force, and substantially shorter duration in self-
employment activities compare to their male counterparts. We will explore the logic 
behind this in the next section.  In both self-employment and formal salaried work, 
although not in informal salaried, duration is higher among older and more educated 
workers.   
 
Table 4 presents the Geweke, Marshall and Zarkin (1986) mobility index for the 
three countries, by country, gender age and educational group.  Argentina emerges as the 
country with the least mobility for all groups with Mexico and Brazil more or less similar 
to each other, with Mexico only slightly more mobile in most of the subgroups.  The 
Argentine matrix appears “slower” even controlling for the higher level of education and 
age of the country.    




Adjusting for job openings and measuring comparative advantage 
 
The third panels of Figures 1a and b, present the adjusted propensities (T matrix) 
and suggest several stylized facts.  First, again particularly among the men, the patterns 
are remarkably similar across countries.  Second, the relative symmetry of the majority of 
pairs of flows when controlling for turnover and job creation, is striking, as might be the 
case if the calculation were being driven by comparative advantage as opposed to a more 
traditional one way segmentation story. This is particularly the case in Mexico for all 
sectors although the informal salaried-formal salaried pairing in Argentina and the self- 
employment-formal pairing in Brazil are also quite similar.  On the other hand, the larger 
conditional flows into formality from both informal sectors in Argentina and into 
formality from informal salaried in Brazil may suggest the more traditional graduation 
pattern found in the segmentation literature.   
 
Finally, the T values between formal salaried and self-employment, while roughly 
symmetric in all cases, are lower than those found among either of the other sectors. This 
may suggest that, as Lucas suggested, the skills needed for each are substantially 
different.  Salaried workers of both formal and informal sectors have similar skills.    
 
II. Approaches to Further Identification 
 
Several notes of caution are necessary when making such inferences.  First of all, 
these statistics are all  reduced form estimates and thus they combine disposition to enter 
and ability to enter.  Hence, we cannot distinguish with confidence, for instance, whether 
the informal salaried prefer other sectors to enter self-employment, on average, or 
whether they may face barriers to entry-credit constraints, for example, as suggested by 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Second, an observed asymmetry of flows may reflect 
  15compositional effects of aggregating across groups with different endowments and hence 
different comparative advantages.  As table 1 shows, for example, self-employed workers 
are substantially older than the salaried workers, whether formal or informal. 
 
The next sections approach these identification issues by disaggregating the data 
in two ways.  First, we exploit regularities that theory or empirical findings from the 
advanced countries offer across age, education, and gender.  In particular, since 
informality is sometimes associated with disguised unemployment, we focus on an 
additional set of transitions- those in and out of the labor force. Second, we disaggregate 
across time, using recent findings from the US on the relationship between job 
finding/losing rates across the business cycle shocks for identification.    
 
Transitions into employment by age, education and gender 
 
The patterns of entry into different sectors of work from OLF and unemployment 
by age, education and gender offer information that is potentially useful for identifying 
among hypotheses of the forces driving or inhibiting transitions. Since we are looking at 
transitions into a common terminal sector, the propensities are sufficient to capture 
disposition.  Figures 3 and 4 show the mean duration in each sector, and the propensity to 
enter employment by age and education, for males. Both are broadly similar for females. 
 
  The intensity matrices in tables 3a, b and c suggest that in both Mexico and 
Brazil, workers are more likely to move directly from OLF into employment than to pass 
through a period of search in unemployment. Argentina, however, appears to present a 
special case where almost 65% of men leaving OLF go into unemployment, a number 
triple the other countries for both genders, again, suggesting special difficulty in 
encountering work in that country.   
 
  In Mexico and Brazil, aggregate accessions from both unemployment and 
inactivity are not greatly out of proportion to the relative shares of job openings in the 
different sectors suggesting, again, that there is little obvious queuing that would lead to a 
  16disproportionate share of entry into work through that sector.  However, again, in 
Argentina a disproportionately high 70% of all accessions occur into informal jobs 
suggesting substantial search to find a job and that that job tends to be informal salaried.  
 
Figure 4 suggests that, once disaggregated by age and education more complex 
stories emerge that demand a nuancing of the aggregate relationships identified above.  
Most notably, the informal self-employed are similar to their first world colleagues in 
their differential behavior by age. In all three countries, the probability of entry into self- 
employment for young workers from OLF or unemployment is a mere fraction of that for 
older workers.  10% or less of young workers (16-24) leaving OLF and unemployment 
choose self-employment as their entry point in the labor market, around 3 times less the 
rate of mature workers (40-60).  Thus, self-employment  is not a port of entry into work.  
Evans and Jovanovic explain the analogous patterns in the US by arguing that, despite a 
presumably lower level of risk aversion among the young, they are not able to enter due 
to credit constraints and must wait until they have accumulated capital. 
 
Figure 3b also suggests that older and better educated workers spend longer spells 
in self-employment.  This would be consistent with the mainstream firm dynamics 
literature that suggests that, while entrepreneurship is a desirable destination, young 
firms, which, ceteris paribus are more likely to be opened by young workers, have very 
high failure rates (see Jovanovic 1982 and Evans and Leighton 1989).  Both patterns 
might, alternatively, be driven by separated older workers being progressively unable to 
find formal sector jobs.  However, the rate of transition into the sector in all three 
countries seems concave in age: we see a gradual increase with something of an 
inflection point at prime age, after which the propensity to enter begins to increase at a 
decreasing rate. This pattern seems more consistent with an interaction of risk aversion 
and the accumulation of sufficient human and physical capital than self-employment 
being primarily a refuge of discarded older workers. Nonetheless, this is an obvious case 
where the observed probability appears to be capturing both a desire to enter, and 
restrictions to doing so, although in this case, the barriers to entry are into the informal 
sector. 
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Gender offers additional information that suggests more comparative advantage 
considerations than barriers to entry into formality. For women, there is an especially 
dynamic corridor between self-employment and OLF: The propensity of women to move 
from OLF to self-employment is 2.3 (Brazil), 3.3 (Mexico) and 8 (Argentina) times 
higher than for males, and the reverse flows are higher than to any sector of work. In fact, 
the rapid transitions between these two sectors largely explain the higher mobility 
indexes for women than for men (See tables 3a-3c). As with older workers, this pattern 
may reflect especially high barriers, perhaps arising from discrimination, to women 
entering formal salaried work.  However, in an alternative view, with lineage to Becker’s 
(1991) work stressing structural determinants of employment patterns, Cunningham 
(1996) argues that Mexican women’s patterns of participation and particularly their 
gravitation toward self-employment are driven by their need to balance their other 
responsibilities in the household: child raising requires a greater job flexibility than the 
salaried sectors offer.  Overall, women do show a lower propensity than men to transit to 
self-employment from unemployment suggesting that this is not a sector of last resort 
after search.   
 
But a stronger test should be that women without family responsibilities should 
show patterns closer to those of men.  Table 5 extracts a cohort of single women for the 
two surveys with a marital status variable, Argentina and Mexico.  The intensity matrices 
of single women are now very similar to those of men and this similarity holds up when 
disaggregated by duration and propensity.  Further, most of the difference in OLF 
duration,
11 the propensities to transition into OLF from every sector, and transitions from 
OLF into self-employment are explained by marital status.
12  In sum, comparative 
advantage considerations, in this case generated by the woman’s need to balance child 
                                                 
11 In fact Argentine single women now spend less time OLF than men do. Similarly, Mexican single 
women spend 2.8 years in OLF instead of 3.9 for their gender overall, far closer to the mean spell of men, 
2.21. 
12 In other dimensions, single women appear to have largely standard male labor market patterns.  In both 
countries, they appear to enter from OLF into search and directly into formal salaried employment at the 
same rates as men and from unemployment they enter with propensities as high or higher than men. 
  18rearing, seems to explain many of the observed transitional patterns and, in particular, the 
exaggerated patterns of entry into informal self-employment.  
 
These findings contrast strongly with the patterns of entry into informal salaried 
work.  Table 2 and Figure 4a and 4b suggest that the sector is very particular:  entry is  
heavily weighted toward the young and, in contrast to self-employment, entry  decreases 
with age from either unemployment or OLF. The one exception appears to be that entry 
in Brazil again rises for older workers from OLF, although still to levels below those of 
the young.  This, combined with the high rates of turnover in the sector, suggests that this 
may be a sector of entry through which young people rapidly pass through on their way 
to preferred desitinations. 
 
 
Transitions out of Employment 
 
Exit flows from employment are broadly similar in all three countries.  However, 
they offer fewer clear identification hypotheses than those offered by entry patterns.   
Informal salaried jobs present higher rates of job separation towards both unemployment 
and inactivity than other sectors of employment. Moreover, the exit rates from informal 
salaried jobs surpass those of their informal self-employed or formal counterparts in any 
age, gender and education cell. These patterns, reflected in unusually short tenure (figure 
2)  may reflect either the lack of attachment to the labor force of informal workers, the 
need to leave work to search for preferred jobs, or alternatively the higher propensity of  
the micro firms where most of these workers are found to destroy unprotected jobs vs 
protected formal jobs. The fact that the informal self-employed, those running the micro 
firms, by contrast, show rates of job separation that are comparable and sometimes even 
lower than formal sector workers and hence substantially higher tenure, again supports 
the interpretation that informal salaried work is not considered as desireable as the the 
other two sectors.  The very high transition rates back into OLF for the young (figure 5a) 
potentially suggests movements between school and temporary work. Comparing across 
countries, Argentina stands alone in its disproportionate rate of job separation towards 
  19unemployment and a somehow lower rate of job separations towards inactivity, again 
suggesting a recessional labor market (See Blanchard and Diamond 1990).  
 
In all three countries, a very strong tendency exists for the informal self-employed 
and informal salaried to transit into unemployment and, in fact, arguably, the informal 
contribute more to unemployment than the formal salaried. Table 6 shows a breakdown 
of the new unemployed by sector of origin computed using original sector sizes and the 
estimated intensities to calculate flows. Surprisingly a large proportion of the 
unemployed actually were previously employed in the informal sectors (40% in Brazil 
and 50% in Mexico). This is especially acute in Argentina where unemployment hovered 
at 20% in recent years.  Overall, 60% of job destruction had its origin in the informal 
sector. 
 
What this means is less clear.  On the one hand, these findings are consistent with 
those from the industrialized countries that micro firms have very high rates of failure, 
and hence failed entrepreneurs and their informal salaried employees are likely to find 
themselves frequently unemployed.  It is somewhat  less consistent with the sector being 
a reliable safety net for separated workers who cannot afford to be unemployed and who 
search for new jobs from the informal sector, although, clearly the two views are 
compatible. 
   
 Transitions across the Business Cycle   
 
  Disaggregating temporally can provide additional identifying restrictions.  For 
example, standard matching models in the Pissarides (2000) tradition postulate that 
search for new jobs- should accelerate in expansions when the probability of finding a job 
is higher. This is consistent with the findings from a relatively integrated market such as 
the US, where we find that upturns are accompanied by increased search of workers 
across jobs- job to job transitions are procyclical (see Nagypal 2004 and Shimer, 2005b): 
If formal and informal markets offer jobs of overall equivalent quality, albeit different 
packages of characteristics, we would expect similar patterns.  On the other hand, the 
  20traditional segmentation view would argue that in periods of economic expansion, the 
increased availability of formal sector jobs, and the reduction in separations, should lead 
to increased flows from informality toward formality, and reduced flows in the opposite 
direction.  
 
To keep the analysis compact, we examine only the Mexican market from 1987-
2004, a period that includes two periods of recovery and crisis.
13  Figure 6 shows the 
evolution of the share of the work force in unemployment, as well as the share of 
formality over total employment sector’s share of the labor market
14 The increase in 
informality in both periods of high unemployment suggests a very traditional view of the 
behavior of the role of the informal sector as a shock absorber for the formal sector and 
perhaps a kind of disguised unemployment. 
 
However, again, the simple stock variables hide important information.  Figure 7 
shows the flows in and out of formal employment. As expected, we observe pro-cyclical 
transitions from informality to formality. But, contrary to the segmented view of the labor 
market, we find virtually identical pro-cyclical transitions from formality to informality, 
especially to self-employment. In fact, the HP filtered correlation between the formal-
self-employment bilateral flows is 0.9.  There is an unusually high transition rate from 
formal employment into self-employment during the 1987-91 boom that mirrors, in fact, 
exceeds the reverse movement from the formal sector.  This suggests that there was a 
particularly strong re-matching between these two types of employment during that 
recovery. There is a decline in sector to sector  search going into the crisis and then a 
recovery again mirrored, although more weakly, in the reverse transition.  Similar 
                                                 
13 In this case we take full advantage of the ENEU and compute the quarterly transitions across 
employment status as described in section II. We also smooth the series using a moving average smoothing 
with a three quarter window.  
14 The share of the formal sector remained reasonably constant from 1987 to 1991 period showing a slight 
decrease in the share of formality from 59% to 57% of total employment, despite a continued decrease in 
unemployment rate. Thereafter, it remains stable around that level up to the eve of the crisis in which it 
bottoms out at 53%.  After the devaluation, it began a sharp recovery, regaining its earlier highs by 2001. 
Finally, despite the fact that the 2001 recession was substantially milder than the Tequila Crisis, formality 
rates fell again to around 54%. These movements are largely mirrored by the movement of unemployment 
from 3% in 1989 to 8% during the crisis and then again down to the lowest levels in the sample in 2001, 
with a slight increase in the last three years of the sample.  
  21evidence, although with lower overall correlation, is found in the transitions between 
formal employment and informal salaried.  
 
The cyclical patterns do shed some more light on the link between informality and 
unemployment. Figure 8 suggests that there are overall similarities in the behavior of 
patterns of job separation among the three employment sectors. In particular, in every 
case, movements into inactivity follow the same procyclical pattern and movements into 
unemployment the same, although in some cases noisier, counter cyclical pattern. 
Confirming the average hazard rates reported above, informal jobs are contribute more to 
the increase in the number of unemployed, particularly during the 1995 recession where 
the separation rate among the informal salaried is the highest among the three.  Also of 
significance, the key movements during the 1995 recession out of formal employment 
were emphatically not directly into the informal sector, but into unemployment.  In fact, 
recalling the finding above, entry into informal work from formal work declines during 
downturns, as is the case with transitions among all sectors of informal work.  In 
addition, the probability of moving into unemployment (Figure 8) during the crisis is just 
below .04 from the formal sector, .06 from self-employment and .13 from informal 
salaried work.  Job separation was largest in the informal sector and accounts for the 
largest flows into unemployment during the crisis.  
 
Clearly, resolving the tension between this finding of integrated formal and 
informal sectors with the noted countercyclical movement in the informal employment 
shares requires substantially deeper understanding of the cyclical dynamics and a more 
complete description of cyclical adjustment is elaborated in Bosch and Maloney (2005).  
However, the present exercise suggests that temporal disaggregation offers some of the 
greatest potential for identifying among different hypotheses about the functioning of 
LDC labor markets.   
 
V. Conclusion  
 
  22This paper has employed a common methodology of estimating continuous time 
Markov processes on panel data from three countries with three purposes.  First, we 
generate a set of stylized facts about LDC labor market dynamics and find a remarkable 
degree of similarity in sectoral duration and transition patterns across the three countries.  
Second, we explore the possible uses for and limitations of a set of statistics for drawing 
inferences from Markov transition matrices. Third, as an example of intrinsic interest in 
itself, we ask to what degree these statistics can shed light on the nature on reason for 
being of the informal sector in developing countries. In the process, we highlight 
problems of heterogeneity and of identification: that transitions statistics have as 
fundamentally reduced forms that conflate comparative advantage in a sector with ability 
to enter the sector. We explore additional identification strategies exploiting variation 
across age, education, gender and time to this end.  Overall, we find patterns of transition 
suggestive that a substantial part of the informal sector, particularly the self-employed, 
corresponds to voluntary entry although informal salaried work appears may correspond 
more closely to the standard queuing view, especially for young workers.  
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 Table 1: Sample Distribution across Sectors and Age and Education Groups. 
  All  14-24  24-40  40-60  Low Education  High Education 
  Male  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Argentina                
                
OLF  20  52 48 66  3  42 11 51 17 60 23 48 
UNM  12  9 14  11  11 9 10 7 15 9 10 9 
SE  21  10  5  3  23 12 31 14 20 11 21 10 
I  13  9 16 8 14  11 9  9 16  12  10 8 
F  35  19 17 12 50 26 38 18 32  8  37 26 
  13,866 15,045 4,322 4,211 3,983 4,355 5,561 6,479 5,392 5,683 8,474 9,362 
Brazil               
               
OLF  16  56 24 55  2  50 20 64 16 63 14 41 
UNM  4  2 6 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 3 4 
SE  20  11  9  5  24 15 28 13 21 12 18  9 
I  15  10 18 11 13 11 12  9  14  8  16 15 
F  45  20 42 24 58 23 38 13 45 15 49 32 
  1,189,651 1,330,537 411,337 455,306 376,590 439,148 383,906 427,538 803,382 906,584 368,451 415,408
Mexico               
               
OLF  16  61 34 61  3  56 11 67 12 68 22 50 
UNM  4  2 5 4 2 2 3 1 4 2 3 3 
SE  28  9  13  3  32 11 41 14 33 11 21  7 
I  10  6 15  8 8 5 6 4  13  7 5 4 
F  42  21 33 24 54 26 40 14 38 13 48 36 
  809,754 975,075 283,627 319,009 267,331 337,356 258,796  318,710 481,680 611,718 328,004 363,306
  Notes:  OLF=Out of the Labor Force, UNM=unemployment, Self=informal self employment, INF=informal salaried, FOR=formal salaried.  
 Table 2: Posterior Probability of Embeddability Indexes various Ages. 
 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
        
All  0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14-24  0.78 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
24-40  0.38 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
40-60  0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Low Education  0.20 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
High Education  0.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
        Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws  
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    Males          Females    
  Intensity Matrix               
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF  -0.390 0.249 0.006 0.106 0.028   OLF  -0.311 0.190 0.043 0.063 0.016
  0.014 0.016 0.004 0.013 0.006     0.007 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.002
UNM  0.194 -1.175  0.267 0.546 0.169   UNM  0.650 -1.330 0.113 0.444 0.122
  0.016 0.035 0.019 0.029 0.016     0.032 0.049 0.019 0.035 0.014
SE  0.023 0.148  -0.424 0.219 0.034   SE  0.230 0.103 -0.655 0.293 0.029
  0.004 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.005     0.016 0.019 0.023 0.021 0.006
I  0.042 0.358 0.258 -0.906 0.247   I  0.231 0.283 0.242 -0.899 0.143
  0.007 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.014     0.019 0.023 0.017 0.030 0.012
FOR  0.004 0.089 0.025 0.092 -0.211   FOR  0.019 0.070 0.020 0.071 -0.181
  0.002 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.006     0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007
  Propensity Matrix              
                 
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF   0.639  0.016 0.272 0.072   OLF  0.610 0.137 0.203 0.050
  0.000 0.030 0.011 0.032 0.016     0.018 0.011 0.017 0.007
UNM  0.165   0.227 0.464 0.144   UNM  0.489 0.085 0.334 0.092
  0.012 0.000 0.015 0.019 0.013     0.018 0.013 0.022 0.009
SE  0.054 0.349    0.516 0.081   SE  0.352 0.157 0.447 0.044
  0.009 0.027 0.000 0.028 0.011     0.024 0.025 0.024 0.010
I  0.047 0.395 0.285   0.273   I  0.257 0.314 0.269 0.159
  0.008 0.023 0.017 0.000 0.015     0.020 0.026 0.018 0.011
FOR  0.017 0.423 0.121 0.439     FOR  0.108 0.389 0.109 0.394
  0.008 0.023 0.013 0.023 0.000     0.023 0.034 0.019 0.032
                
  Average  Duration             
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
  2.569 0.852 2.360 1.105 4.750     3.204 0.750 1.533 1.111 5.574
  0.078 0.029 0.078 0.033 0.147     0.071 0.027 0.048 0.035 0.246
Notes: Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws  
  30Table 3b: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix: Brazil 
a l e s     M           F e m   a s l e   
  Intensity Matrix                
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF  -0.420 0.117 0.065 0.137 0.101   OLF  -0.221 0.048 0.077 0.056 0.039
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001     0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UNM  0.391 -2.069  0.298 0.588 0.792   UNM  0.900 -2.106 0.127 0.470 0.608
  0.004 0.010 0.004 0.007 0.006     0.007 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.006
SE  0.082 0.052  -0.426 0.201 0.091   SE  0.429 0.014 -0.649 0.159 0.047
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001     0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
I  0.160 0.167 0.308 -1.102 0.468   I  0.293 0.132 0.210 -1.348 0.414
  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
FOR  0.037 0.079 0.037 0.069 -0.223   FOR  0.074 0.060 0.017 0.069 -0.221
  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001     0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
                
  Propensity Matrix              
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF   0.278  0.155 0.327 0.240   OLF  0.220 0.348 0.255 0.177
  0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002     0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
UNM  0.189   0.144 0.284 0.383   UNM  0.428 0.061 0.223 0.289
  0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002     0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
SE  0.192 0.123    0.472 0.213   SE  0.661 0.022 0.245 0.073
  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
I  0.145 0.151 0.279   0.425   I  0.279 0.126 0.200 0.395
  0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
FOR  0.168 0.356 0.167 0.310     FOR  0.335 0.273 0.079 0.314
  0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000     0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
                
  Average Duration              
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F      OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
  2.378 0.483 2.350 0.907 4.482     4.531 0.475 1.540 0.954 4.519
  0.006 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.012     0.012 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.016
 
Notes: Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws 
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Table 3c: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix: Mexico 
a l e s a     M           F e m   l e   s  
  I n t e n s i t y   M a   t r i x
t r
t i o
            
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF  -0.451 0.141 0.035 0.180 0.095   OLF  -0.256 0.049 0.064 0.083 0.060
  0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
UNM  0.580 -2.246  0.222 0.814 0.630   UNM  1.330 -2.412 0.051 0.539 0.492
  0.012 0.024 0.008 0.016 0.012     0.017 0.025 0.007 0.016 0.011
SE  0.034 0.026  -0.501 0.265 0.175   SE  0.530 0.007 -0.759 0.180 0.042
  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001     0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002
I  0.099 0.099 0.259 -0.869 0.412   I  0.464 0.090 0.139 -1.056 0.362
  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002     0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003
FOR  0.023 0.045 0.055 0.093 -0.216   FOR  0.080 0.035 0.019 0.115 -0.248
  0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001     0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
                
  P r o p e n s i t y   M a   i x             
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
OLF   0.313  0.077 0.399 0.211   OLF  0.190 0.251 0.323 0.236
  0.000 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004     0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
UNM  0.258   0.099 0.363 0.280   UNM  0.552 0.021 0.223 0.204
  0.004 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005     0.006 0.002 0.005 0.004
SE  0.068 0.052    0.530 0.349   SE  0.697 0.009 0.238 0.056
  0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003     0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002
I  0.114 0.114 0.298   0.474   I  0.440 0.085 0.132 0.344
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002     0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
FOR  0.107 0.209 0.252 0.432     FOR  0.322 0.140 0.078 0.461
  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.000     0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004
                
  A v e r a g e   D u r a   n             
  OLF UNM  SE  I  F     OLF UNM  SE  I  F 
  2.218 0.445 1.996 1.151 4.620     3.906 0.414 1.318 0.948 4.025
  0.012 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.017     0.013 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.021
 
Notes: Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws 
  32Table 4: Mobility Indexes various Ages. 
  Argentina Brazil  Mexico 
          
  Male   Female  Male   Female  Male   Female 
All  0.621 0.675 0.848 0.909 0.857 0.946 
  0.0111 0.0132 0.0057 0.0068 0.0037 0.0042 
14-24        
  0.7676 0.8533 0.9430 0.9908 0.9108 0.9740 
  0.0262 0.0403 0.0116 0.0132 0.0055 0.0064 
24-40        
  0.6915 0.7667 0.7883 0.8360 0.8629 0.8888 
  0.0273 0.0268 0.0110 0.0114 0.0080 0.0089 
40-60        
  0.5985 0.6653 0.6946 0.8342 0.8363 0.9054 
  0.0180 0.0195 0.0112 0.0209 0.0077 0.0115 
Low Education        
  0.6518 0.7665 0.7811 0.8919 0.8512 0.9383 
  0.0172 0.0239 0.0077 0.0104 0.0050 0.0068 
High Education        
  0.6155 0.6808 0.6978 0.7104 0.8374 0.8957 
  0.0140 0.0163 0.0089 0.0099 0.0059 0.0063 
Notes: Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo draws Standard Errors below 
 
  33Table 5: Intensity Matrix, Duration and Propensity Matrix for Single Females:  
Argentina and Mexico 
 
Intensity Matrix    Argentina    Intensity Matrix    Mexico     
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR     OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
OLF  -0.398 0.282 0.013 0.065 0.038    OLF  -0.357 0.146 0.039 0.085 0.087 
  0.014 0.016 0.005 0.009 0.006      0.002  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UNM  0.466 -1.086 0.075 0.360 0.185    UNM  1.118 -2.052  0.098  0.305  0.531 
  0.038 0.059 0.020 0.042 0.024      0.019  0.025 0.007 0.012 0.012 
SE  0.135 0.183  -0.762  0.363 0.080    SE  0.274  0.048 -0.590 0.178 0.091 
  0.037 0.052 0.066 0.059 0.025      0.006  0.005 0.007 0.005 0.004 
I  0.157 0.395 0.185  -0.876  0.139    I  0.291 0.110  0.116  -0.889  0.371 
  0.031 0.049 0.029 0.053 0.023      0.006  0.005 0.003 0.008 0.005 
F  0.015 0.097 0.021 0.053  -0.186    F  0.070 0.052  0.015  0.074  -0.211 
  0.007 0.013 0.006 0.010 0.012      0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
                 
Propensity Matrix       Propensity Matrix     
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR     OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
OLF   0.706  0.032  0.164  0.098   OLF   0.409  0.109  0.239  0.243 
   0.031  0.013  0.026  0.016       0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004 
UNM  0.430  0.069  0.331  0.170   UNM  0.545   0.048  0.149  0.259 
  0.029  0.019  0.032  0.021     0.006   0.003  0.006  0.005 
SE  0.178 0.241    0.477 0.105    SE  0.464 0.081    0.302  0.154 
  0.047 0.066    0.063 0.033      0.009 0.008    0.008  0.006 
I  0.179 0.450 0.212    0.159    I  0.328 0.124  0.130    0.418 
  0.035 0.047 0.030    0.026      0.006  0.006  0.004  0.005 
F  0.081 0.522 0.113 0.284      F  0.334 0.246  0.070  0.349   
  0.037 0.060 0.032 0.051        0.006 0.006  0.003  0.005   
                 
Average Duration        Duration        
 OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR     OLF  UNM  SELF  INF  FOR 
 2.512  0.924  1.322  1.145  5.408     2.801  0.488  1.696  1.125  4.750 
  0.110 0.050 0.114 0.069 0.362      0.021  0.006 0.021 0.010 0.038 
Notes: Standard Errors in italics below. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo 
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Table 6: New Unemployed by Sector of Origin  
 
  Self-Employment  Informal Salaried  Formal Salaried 
Argentina  31% 35% 34% 
Brazil  15% 24% 61% 
Mexico  28% 22% 49% 
The results were computed using original sector sizes and the estimated intensities to 
calculate flows into unemployment 
 
 Figure 1a: Intensities, Propensities and Adjusted Propensities among sectors (Males) 
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Notes:  Figure represent probabilities of transition among the Formal (F), Self employed (SE) and Informal Salaried (I) sectors.  The Intensities correspond to 
raw instantaneous probabilities; the Propensities standardize the intensities by the instantaneous probability of leaving the initial sector; the Adjusted Propensities 
further adjust by the availability of positions in the final sector and constitute a measure of revealed comparative advantage. 
  36.Figure 1b: Intensities, Propensities and Adjusted Propensities among sectors (Females) 
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Notes:  Figure represent probabilities of transition among the Formal (F), Self employed (SE) and Informal Salaried (I) sectors.  The Intensities correspond to 
raw instantaneous probabilities; the Propensities standardize the intensities by the instantaneous probability of leaving the initial sector; the Adjusted Propensities 
further adjust by the availability of positions in the final sector and constitute a measure of revealed comparative advantage. 
 
  37Figure 2: Absolute Mean Duration in Each Sector in Years 
 





















  38Figure 3a: Mean Duration in Employment Statues by Age and Education in non Employment Sectors (in Years). 
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1987q1 1991q3 1996q1 2000q3 2005q1
% For Unem. Rate
 
Notes:  Constructed with quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU). % For is the share of formal employment 
constructed as number of formal workers over total employment. Unemployment rate (Unem. Rate) corresponds to number of 
unemployed workers over total labor force. The series have been smoothed using a moving average filter with a three quarter window. 
 



































































































































































1987q1 1991q3 1996q1 2000q3 2005q1
I-For F-I
 
Notes: Transition rates among sectors rates inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period using quarterly data 
from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in 
section II. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. OLF=Out of the Labor Force, UNM=Unemployment rate, 
I=Informal Salaried, SE=Informal Self-employed, F=Formal Sector. 





















































Notes: Transition rates among sectors rates inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period using quarterly data 
from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4 following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in 
section II. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. OLF=Out of the Labor Force, UNM=Unemployment rate, 
I=Informal Salaried, SE=Informal Self-employed, F=Formal Sector 
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